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The objectives of this paper are twofolcJ: (a) to integrate the themy and research on clinical reasoning that has appeared in the occupatiunal therap)' literature in mder to show the similarities and differences among the various views, ancJ (b) to suggest cJirections for funher theory building and research. At the encJ of this review, a conceptualizatiun of clinical reasoning is proposecJ th,lt builds on a synthesis of current literature. This framework expancJs descriptions of clinical reasoning and raises considerations for future research. It also directs managers ancl educators to new considerations when attempting to suPPOrt the develupment of clinical reasuning in students and staff.
The literature in occupational therapy roughly parallels the wmk on clinical reasoning in other professions such as mecJicine (Elstein, Shulman, & Sprafka, 1978; SchmicJt, Norman, & Boshuizen, 1990 ) and nursing (Benner, 1984) as well as the rnme general analyses of professional practice (Sch(in, 198.3, 1987) . As cJemonstrated in this literature, old assumptions of professional rationality and the scientific method arc being challengecJ, and new views of' the roles of practical knowledge and practice context are being evaluated (Celvero, 1988; Schon, 1983; Yerxa, 1991) SchiJn statecl this view clearly.
This liriclllllla of "r,,;ol' or rclC\':lIlCC" a,'iscs Illorc aculcil' in SOIllC arcas of pr,ruilc th:1I1 in othcr.s. 111 thc \'Jricli topography of pmfCs,;ional Jl!'auic(' Ihnc is ;1 high. hard ground \\ herc fJraniIrOner.s can m:!kc cfreCli\'c use of l'l'SGlITh-bascd Theory and lcch· rr1llt c. aile! lhl'rc i'i" ,;\\;]rnpI'lo\\ land where SrIU~lion'i arc confu'iing mcs'iCs" incapablc of IcchJlll'a1 'iOIUlion. The difficulll' is lhJI thc prohlcrns of lhc high ground, Il00I'ever greal their lechnical interest. .HC uhen rcl;:uivch' uninlpon:Clllt IO clients or to the larger society, while in th<: swamp a,-e [he problem, of g,-e<![eSl human concern_ (J 985, p. 42) Most of the research in occupational ther<lpy corresronds with one of Schon's two epistemologies of rrofessional practice, technical rationality and reflenion-in-action. Consistent with these two epistemologies, we have labeled the two major strands of the research in occupational therapy scientific reasoning and narrative reasoning. These labels were chosen to reflect the larger constructs that they represent. Scientific reasoning implies a logical process based on hypotheses testing (Rogers, 1983) . Narrative reasoning reflects a phenomenological process in which stOries are used to give meaning to therapeutic events (Mattingly, 1991b) .
We have also identified an emerging third view of therapists' thinking, which we have labeled pragmatic reasoning This view is consistent with a new account of mental activity being developed by cognitive psychologists that considers the context in which that mental activity occurs (Brown, Collins, & DugUid, 1989; Lave, 1988 (Cohn, 1991; Neistadt, 1987 Neistadt, , 1992 . It may also rcframe our understanding of the influence of personal and practice constraints such as therapist motivation, reimbursement regulations, and equipment options. In the past these have been considered barriers to effective clinical reasoning (Barris, 1987; Neuhaus, 1988; Rogers & Masagatani, 1982) . We argue that they are an inherent pan of the clinical reasoning process. We label this third aspect of clinical reasoning pragmatic reasoning. 
SCientific Reasoning
Much of the work of Rogers and her colleagues (Rogers, 1983 (Rogers, ,1986 Rogers & Holm, 1991; Rogers & Masagatani, 1982) has centered on the notion of clinical reasoning as a systematic cognitive process. In her Eleanor Clarke Slagle lecture, Rogers described clinical reasoning as the "thinking that guides practice" (1983, p. 601), and elaborated that "cognitive activity constitutes the heart of the clinical enterprise" (p. 601). The goal of clinical reasoning is to decide on a treatment recommendation that is made in the best interest of a particular patient. To do this, the therapist must answer three critical questions: "What is the patient's current status in occupational role performance J What could be done to enhance the patient's performance J And what ought to be done ro enhance occupational competence' (p. 602).
Rogers' view of clinical reasoning is heavily based on a rarional model of cognirive processing that is exemplified by the scientific method. In many respects, she reflects Schon's "high, hard ground where practitioners can make effective use of research-based rheory and technique" (1983, p. 42) . With the exception of one article (Rogers & Masagatani, 1982) , all of her work is based on rheory generated from data collecred in other professions such as medicine. The exception was a qualitative study in which 10 occupational therapists were observed and interviewed relative to initial evaluation of patienrs, to "examine the manner in which therapists select, assemble, and use data to reach a judgement about a patient's status" (Rogers & Masagatani, 1982, p. 218) .
Scientific reasoning as a framework is appealing, because it lends a systematiC feel to the occupational therapy process. Ir has been seen as a way ro professionalize occupational therapy (see Parham, 1987; Yerxa, 1991 , for insights into this perspective). To improve clinical reasoning from this perspective, pracritioners need to follow the scientific model more effectively. Several prescriptive approaches for this can be found in the literature (Cubic & Kaplan, 1982; Pellancl, 1987; Rogers & Holm, 1991) .
. They generally advocated the selection of a frame of reference, development of a systematic data collection system, generarion of competing hypotheses, and effective hypothesis testing throughout the therapy process. Scientific reasoning has undoubtedly made major contributions to the professionalization of rhe field, but it is insufficient by itself to adequately explain the complexity of clinical practice. Rogers acknowledged that "As rhe clinical reasoning process moves from an assessment of occupational status, to a review of treatment options, to a selection of the right action, rhe scienrific mode of reasoning gives way to nonscientific intellectual processes" (1983, p. 610 ). The reader is left wondering how the clinician actually decides what to do. Additionally, this view does not attend to the role that the therapist's personal and practice contexts place on the reasoning process. The cognitive theorists discussed earlier would suggest that cognitive processes are inherently embedded in contextual situations, which in fact activate particular kinds of knowledge (Brown et a1., 1989; Lave, 1988) . In the scientific view, these tend to be presented as limitations to clinical reasoning, rather than integral to the process (Rogers & Holm, 1991 , p. 1046 . Finally, while admiring scientific reasoning, one wonders whether clinicians actually have the time to go through the many steps in the suggested detail outlined by its proponents. Rogers and rVlasagatani's study suggested that they may not, as they noted that therapists seemed to base treatment decisions more on a "standard operating procedure approach to clinical thinking" than on "scientific thinking" (1982, p. 215) .
Narrative Reasoning
In contrast to Rogers, Mattingly suggested that clinical reasoning is a "largely tacit, highly imagistic, and deeply phenomenological mode of thinking" (1991a, p. 979).
Her description is based on research conducted as part of the AOTF clinical reasoning study, in which a staff of 14 occupational therapists in a large acute care hospital were closely studied over a 2-year period (Mattingly & GillLtte, 1991) . She suggested that clinical reasoning is not just having a reason for treatment; rather, it is a form of practical reasoning directed toward action. Because therapists must do things with patients, and must do them so as to enlist the patient's active partiCipation, therapy involves attention to the "human world of motives, values and beliefs" (1991a, p. 983). As such, it becomes more of an improvisational process in which reading the context of the problem from the patient's perspective is the key clinical reasoning task.
Mattingly saw clinical reasoning as occurring throughout the treatment process, in contrast to earlier research focusing on the assessment phase of therapy. Mattingly contended "that it is often during the process of treatment rather than initial assessment that the thorniest clinical processes present themselves" (1991a, p. 985). As a student of Schon's, Mattingly appeared to be addressing the "s\vampy lowland where situations are confUSing 'messes' incapable of technical solution" and problems are of "greatest human concern" (Schon, 1983, p. 42) .
So what does clinical reasoning in the swam ps involve? Mattingly (1991b) The American Journal 0/ Occupational Therapy persons with long-term disabilities, one must trea[ the whole patient, which involves looking beyond the disease, to how that disease is experienced by that particular patient" (1991b, p. 1000). Narrative reasoning occurs in twO primary ways: through therapists sharing stories, and through therapists creating therapeutic Stories with current patients.
According to Mattingly (1991b) , therapists tell stories about patients to each other, to help them reason through how a particular patient will experience the biomedical condition affecting him or her. Stories about past and current patients help the therapist visualize the course of therapy for this person. Therapists also create therapeu[ic stories to help patients invent new futures for themselves: "Therapists must be able to picture a larger temporal whole, one that captures what they can see in a particular pa[ient in the present and what they can imagine seeing sometime in the future. This picturing process gives [hem a basis for organizing tasks" (l991b, p. 1001) This form of narra[ive reasoning was then used as the basis for selection and communication about therapeutic activities, so [hal [he [herarist and the patient saw themselves "in the same story" (1991b, p. 1002).
With [his view, Mattingly distanced clinical reasoning from the scientific process and located it within a phenomenological perspective. She viewed scientific reasoning as most useful in addressing biomedically related assessment, which she considered as only a small part of what therapists actually think about (1991a). Clinical reasoning still seems to be a combination of thinking and verbal interaCtion geared toward understanding.
Mattingly suggested that to improve clinical reasoning, occupational [herapists must "take their phenomenological tasks more seriously" (1991a, p. 986) by focusing on the meaning [hat disability has to the patient and addressing [he motiva[ional issues affecting patient performance. A greater apprecia[ion for the context of the patient experience becomes critical. Legitimizing narrative thinking as a critical component of the therapy process will improve [reatment. Her view is appealing, because it gives voice to therapists' concerns with contextual issues and legitimizes the informal discussion about patients that is the counterpoint to the formal scientific reports more often seen in team planning meetings and medical records. However, this view is still focused on the patient-therapist interaction, with particular attention given to the meaning that the patient attaches to both the disabling condition and the therapy process. It neglects [he larger practice context in which this interaction is occurring, which includes constraints imposed by reimbursement, equipment, and organizational culture.
Combining Scientific and Narrative Reasoning
Fleming, who served as co-inves[igator in the AOTF Clinical Reasoning Study, suggested that clinical reasoning involvcs multiple mode~ of thinking that "are for different purpo~e~, or in re~ponse to rarticular features of the clinical problem" (1991, r 1007). These form~ ofreasoning are narrative, rroceduraJ, interactive, and conditionaL Narrative rea~oning has already been dlscu~sed above.
Procedural reasoning i~ a "dual search for problem definition and treatment selection" (Fleming, 1991 (Fleming, , r. 1008 , and in many ways echoes the idea of scientific reJ~oning. It is employed when thinking about the "cti~ease or di~ ability" (p. 1008) and related treatment activities.lnteractivereasoning [Ook place during "face-to-face encounters between the therapist and the patient" (p. 1010), and was dirccted towJnJ better understanding of the patient as a person. This process served many needs, including gaining the phenomenological perspective of the illness experience, to more finely match treatment choices with patient preferences, gain trust, ~hare meaning, and check on progress of treatment. Conditional reasoning involved the u~e of both logical and nonlogical method~ (such a~ imagination and intuition) to place the patient in current and possible future social contexts (p. 1011). According to Fleming, this type of reasoning allowcd the thcrapist to envision several future rossibilities and refine treatment to match the current and future contexts. Each of these forms of reasoning seem~ to relate to the development of clinical experti~e, in that procedural reasoning was seen in all therarist~, interactive reasoning in therapists with increaseu experience, anu conditional reasoning in therapists with greater experience and expcrtise.
To improve clinical reasoning, therapi~ts must "become facile in thinking about different a~pect~ of human bcings Llsing various styles of reasoning" (Fleming, 1991 (Fleming, , p. 1013 ). Fleming noted that each style helps thc therapist put together holi~tic treatment that is directed to both present anu future concern~. Slater and Cohn (1991) , as a result of their experiences in the AOTF clinical reasoning study, advocated a peer-mentoring system of staff development that allows more expert staff to help novice practitioners gain expertise in using the various styles of thinking.
Fleming's important contribution, along with that of Mattingly, is the recognition of multiple aspects to the clinical rea~oning proce~~. She effectively synthesized several aspects of clinical reasoning to allow for therapists' attention to the individual biomedical situation and the meaning of that situation to the person. In paying attention to both, the therapist is enabled to walk up and uown the slopes between Schon's "high ground" anu the "swamps," using thc form of reasoning neccssary to meet the situation's demanus. However, Fleming did not address other aspects of clinical reasoning alluded to by some authors (Barri~, 19t)7; Fondiller, Rosage, & Neuhaus, 1990; Howard, 1991; Neuhaus, 19t)8) . Foremost among these are the reasoning processes related to the therapi~ts' personal context, as well a~ that of the practice setting.
Pmgmatic Reasoning
A number of authors have raised concerns about the effect of various organizational, political, and economic realities on the practice of occupational therapy (Barris, 1987; Fondillet-et aI., 1990; Howard, 1991; Neuhaus, 198t) ). It seems logical that contextual factors that inhibit or facilitate therar)' are themselves part of the clinical reasoning process. In an exrloratory study of clinical reasoning of therapists practiCing in psychosocial settings, Barris (1987) noted that patient poruJation, hosrital setting, and depJrtment tradition (e.g., content of evaluation forms) tended to have more influence on therapists' clinical reasoning than did their beliefs and attitudcs. Neuhaus clescribed some of these issues clearly when she discussed the effect of technology and cost containment on the clinical reasoning process:
[Tlhe therapi~[ has increasingly le~~ control over whom to treal, when and how.... A major ethical issue, and one that is all tou familiar to occupational therapists, is the denial of treatment to a meclicJlly qualilled per~on bccau~c uf inability to payor ineligibility or fOt' tl1ird-pany payment. (1988, p. 291, 292) .
She went on to describe a related but opposite dilemma that occurs when therapists are reqUired to fulfiJl prescribcd intensities of treatment to meet federal policies, regardless of arparent patient need for that intensity. A third variation of environmental pressure is seen when budgetary and personnel shortages result in too many patients for therapists to effectively manage, thus requiring the therarists to ration their services.
To improve clinical reasoning, Neuhaus supported the use of open discussion among peers and with mentors, to allow for discussion of and reflection about the conflicts between values and the treatment environment. AdditionaJly, she advocated the use of groups of colleagues for important decisions, to allow for better ethical analysis. AJthough Neuhaus framed these issues as recent developments resulting from cost containment and technology developments, it is likely that these issues have always been with the profession. By noting them as an important component of clinical reasoning, clinicians are given one more perspective from which to view the process.
In a provoking article focused on clinical research, Tornebohm (1991) raised ~everal interesting issues relevant to clinical reasoning. He proposed that each therapist represents a unique raradigm consisting of several parts. The major components of the therapists' paradigms are (a) their view and ideas about occupational therapy, (b) their ability to treat patients, (c) their life knowledge and assumptions, and (d) their interest in patients and the profession The therapiSt's effectiveness can be seen as a relJtion~hip between the therapist's pat'acligm and the person being treated. From this perspective, new question~ arise. Is part of clinical rea~oning related to the therapi~t'~ per~onal paradigm' Other~ (Fleming, 1991; Rogers, 1983) 
Future Directions
We believe that clinical reasoning is a J11ultifacetecJ pmcess that includes, not only scientific and nalTative reasoning, but pragmatic reasoning directed to issues beyond those presented by therapist-patient inter'1Ction. Pragmatic reasoning may parallel what Fleming described as conditional reasoning (1991), but its focus is much broader. It is not only concerned wi th the contextual issues affecting the patient now and in the future; it is also concerned with the personal context of the therapist and the culture of the practice environment. Through the inclusion of these variables in the clinical l'easoning framewmk, both prescriptive and desniptive notions of clinical reasoning will become more anchmed in the daily realities of clinical practice.
The concerns of pragmatic reasoning include both the therapist's rersonal and practice contexts. Example; of therapist contexts are repertoire of thnapy skills, ability to read the practice culture, negotiation skills, and personal motivation. Examples of the practice context arc the power relationships of occupational therapv within the organization, reimbursement resources for treatment services, and the kinds of available space and equipment. Therapists reason about all of these lssues when they plan for, supervise, implement, and reflect on occupational therapy services.
Implications
Research is needed that directly acJdrcsses the roles that pe::rsonal and practice contexts play in the clinical reasoning process. Such research would allow for a more grounded description of clinical reasoning. If contextual issues prove to be an inherent pan of the process, then both pl'e::professional and staff development models could be designed to directl)! attend to the contextual aspects of clinical reasoning.
Several authors have suggested educational approach.~s that allow for attemion to contextllal issues (Cohn, 1989; Neistadt, 1987 Neistadt, , 1992 Slater & Cohn, 1991) .
With the exception of Slater and Cohn (1991) , these:: approach,.~s are directed primarily to preprofessional and fieldwork education. There is a need to build on these and to develop other approaches that support the ongoing development of clinical exrenise Practice will be strengthened by educational approaches that support therapists' identification of their own practice theories, and understanding of how embeckled their knowledge is in their personal and practice Cl)ntext, Raising these issues allows practice theories to be examined for validity within a particulal' context and across rnultiple CO!Hexts. Allditionally, supervisms and rn:1I1agers will be directed to an appreciation of how strongly the pr:1Ctice context affects the decisions that therapisLs make in pmviding care. Supervisors become guides. Supervision becomes the critical link in helping therapists evaluate their own assumptlons and develt)l) the skills needed to negotiate contextual issues in favor of Lheir patients' needs. Managers will be able to su ppoJ't staff development more effectivelv when the" recogni7.e that expenise is embodied in the therapist who is not only motivated, with a lal'gc repertoire of patient treatment skills, but also able to .successfully negotiate contextual issues in favor uf improvell patient cal'e .•
